How to share a quantum secret by Cleve, Richard et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
99
01
02
5v
1 
 1
2 
Ja
n 
19
99
How to share a quantum secret
Richard Cleve1∗, Daniel Gottesman2†, Hoi-Kwong Lo3‡
1 Department of Computer Science, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4
2 T-6 Group, Los Alamos National Lab, Los Alamos, NM 87545
3 Hewlett-Packard Labs, Bristol, UK BS34 8QZ
We investigate the concept of quantum secret sharing. In
a ((k, n)) threshold scheme, a secret quantum state is di-
vided into n shares such that any k of those shares can be
used to reconstruct the secret, but any set of k − 1 or fewer
shares contains absolutely no information about the secret.
We show that the only constraint on the existence of thresh-
old schemes comes from the quantum “no-cloning theorem”,
which requires that n < 2k, and, in all such cases, we give an
efficient construction of a ((k, n)) threshold scheme. We also
explore similarities and differences between quantum secret
sharing schemes and quantum error-correcting codes. One
remarkable difference is that, while most existing quantum
codes encode pure states as pure states, quantum secret shar-
ing schemes must use mixed states in some cases. For exam-
ple, if k ≤ n < 2k−1 then any ((k, n)) threshold scheme must
distribute information that is globally in a mixed state.
Suppose that the president of a bank wants to give
access to a vault to three vice presidents who are not en-
tirely trusted. Instead of giving the combination to any
one individual, it may be desirable to distribute informa-
tion in such a way that no vice president alone has any
knowledge of the combination, but any two of them can
jointly determine the combination. In 1979, Blakely [1]
and Shamir [2] addressed a generalization of this prob-
lem, by showing how to construct schemes that divide a
secret into n shares such that any k of those shares can
be used to reconstruct the secret, but any set of k − 1
or fewer shares contains absolutely no information about
the secret. This is called a (k, n) threshold scheme, and
is a useful tool for designing cryptographic key manage-
ment systems.
Now, consider a generalization of such schemes to the
setting of quantum information, where the secret is an ar-
bitrary unknown quantum state. Salvail [3] (see also [4])
obtained a method to divide an unknown qubit into two
shares, each of which individually contains no informa-
tion about the qubit, but which jointly can be used
to reconstruct the qubit. Hillery, Buzˇek, and Berthi-
aume [4] proposed a method for implementing some clas-
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sical threshold schemes that uses quantum information
to transmit the shares securely in the presence of eaves-
droppers.
Define a ((k, n)) threshold scheme, with k ≤ n, as a
method to encode and divide an arbitrary secret quan-
tum state (which is given but not, in general, explicitly
known) into n shares with the following two properties.
First, from any k or more shares the secret quantum state
can be perfectly reconstructed. Second, from any k − 1
or fewer shares, no information at all can be deduced
about the secret quantum state. Formally, this means
that the reduced density matrix of these k − 1 shares
(with the other shares traced out) is independent of the
value of the secret. Each share can consist of any num-
ber of qubits (or higher-dimensional states), and not all
shares need to be of the same size. In this paper we do
not consider the problem of securely creating and dis-
tributing the shared secret, and simply assume that it
can be done when necessary.
Quantum secret sharing schemes might be used in the
context of sharing quantum keys, such as those proposed
by Weisner [5] for uncounterfeitable “quantum money.”
They can also be used to provide interesting ways of dis-
tributing quantum entanglement and nonlocality. For ex-
ample, suppose that Alice has one qubit of an EPR pair
and a ((2, 2)) threshold scheme is applied to the other
qubit to produce a share for Bob and a share for Carol.
Then Alice and Bob together have a product state (i.e.,
ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB), as do Alice and Carol; however, Bob
and Carol can jointly construct a qubit from their shares
that is in an EPR state with Alice’s qubit. Also, for
quantum storage or quantum computations to be robust
in the worst-case situation where a component or a group
of components fail (due to sabotage by malicious parties
or due to defects), quantum secret sharing may prove
to be a useful concept. Finally, by definition, quantum
secret sharing distributes trust between various parties
and prevents a small coalition of malicious parties from
learning a quantum secret.
Let us begin with an example of a ((2, 3)) threshold
scheme. The secret here is an arbitrary three-dimensional
quantum state (a quantum trit or qutrit). The encoding
maps the secret qutrit to three qutrits as
α |0〉+ β |1〉+ γ |2〉 7→ α(|000〉+ |111〉+ |222〉) + (1)
β(|012〉+ |120〉+ |201〉) +
γ(|021〉+ |102〉+ |210〉),
1
and each resulting qutrit is taken as a share. Note that,
from a single share, absolutely no information can be
deduced about the secret, since each individual share is
always in the totally mixed state (an equal mixture of
|0〉, |1〉, and |2〉). On the other hand, the secret can be
reconstructed from any two of the three shares as follows.
If we are given the first two shares (for instance), add the
value of the first share to the second (modulo three), and
then add the value of the second share to the first, to
obtain the state
(α |0〉+ β |1〉+ γ |2〉)(|00〉+ |12〉+ |21〉). (2)
The first qutrit now contains the secret. The reconstruc-
tion procedure for the other cases is similar, by the sym-
metry of mapping (1) with respect to cyclic permutations
of the three qutrits.
Note that, because the data is quantum, one must be
careful not to individually measure the shares while per-
forming the reconstruction, since this will collapse any
superposition of the basis states. The same considera-
tions arise with quantum error-correcting codes [6,7]. In
fact, the above example is a three-qutrit quantum code
that can correct one erasure error. Every quantum se-
cret sharing scheme is, in some sense, a quantum error-
correcting code; however, some error-correcting codes are
not secret sharing schemes, since they may contain sets
of shares from which partial information about the secret
can be obtained. For example, consider a four-qubit code
[8,9] that corrects one erasure by the encoding
α |0〉+ β |1〉 7−→ α(|0000〉+ |1111〉) + β(|0011〉+ |1100〉)
(the code can actually be extended to encode two qubits,
but we do not need this for our illustration). While it
is true that any three qubits suffice to reconstruct the
secret, it is not true that two qubits provide no informa-
tion. For instance, given the first and third qubits, one
can distinguish between the secrets |0〉 and |1〉. More
generally, from these two qubits, statistical information
about the relative values of |α| and |β| can be obtained.
Later, we shall show how to obtain a ((3, 4)) threshold
scheme with four qubits using a different approach.
Returning to the ((2, 3)) threshold scheme using
qutrits, note that it can be used to share a secret that
is a qubit by simply not using the third dimension of
the input space (though the resulting shares are still full
qutrits). It turns out that there does not exist a ((2, 3))
threshold scheme for qubits in which each share is also
a qubit. This is because such a scheme would also be a
three-qubit code that corrects single qubit erasure errors,
which has been shown not to exist [9].
The ((2, 3)) qutrit threshold scheme can be used to
construct a ((2, 2)) threshold scheme, by simply discard-
ing (i.e., tracing out) one of the three shares. Note that
the resulting ((2, 2)) scheme produces a mixed state en-
coding even when the secret is a pure state. The encoding
procedure can be defined by the following linear map on
density matrices
|0〉〈0| 7→ |00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|+ |22〉〈22|
|1〉〈1| 7→ |01〉〈01|+ |12〉〈12|+ |20〉〈20| (3)
|2〉〈2| 7→ |02〉〈02|+ |10〉〈10|+ |21〉〈21| .
Call a scheme that encodes pure state secrets using global
pure states a pure state scheme, and a scheme for which
the encodings of pure states are sometimes in global
mixed states a mixed state scheme. We shall show later
that there does not exist a pure state ((2, 2)) threshold
scheme.
On the other hand, if we do not insist on protecting
an arbitrary secret, we could use the encoding
α |0〉+ β |1〉 7→ α(|00〉 − |11〉) + β(|01〉+ |10〉). (4)
For the restricted set of secrets where α · β∗ is real-
valued, it functions as a ((2, 2)) threshold scheme. How-
ever, without this restriction, this is not a secret sharing
scheme, since (for example) it can be verified that a sin-
gle share can completely distinguish between the secrets
|0〉 + i |1〉 and |0〉 − i |1〉. Although such a scheme may
be useful in some contexts, we shall henceforth consider
only “unrestricted” secret sharing schemes.
Note that the previously mentioned technique of dis-
carding a share from a ((2, 3)) threshold scheme to obtain
a ((2, 2)) threshold scheme (suggested by [10] in the con-
text of a different scheme) generalizes considerably:
Theorem 1. From any ((k, n)) threshold scheme with
n > k, a ((k, n−1)) threshold scheme can be constructed
by discarding one share.
In the classical case, a (k, n) threshold scheme exists
for every value of n ≥ k. However, this does not hold in
the quantum case, due to the quantum “no-cloning theo-
rem” [11,12], which states that no operation can produce
multiple copies of an unknown arbitrary quantum state.
Theorem 2. If n ≥ 2k then no ((k, n)) threshold scheme
exists.
Proof. If a ((k, n)) threshold scheme exists with n ≥ 2k
then the following procedure can be used to make two
independent copies of an arbitrary quantum state (that
is, to clone). First, apply the ((k, n)) scheme to the state
to produce n shares. Then, taking two disjoint sets of k
shares, reconstruct two independent copies of the state.
This contradicts the “no-cloning theorem” [11,12]. 2
The five-qubit quantum code proposed in [13,14] im-
mediately yields a ((3, 5)) threshold scheme. First, since
it corrects any two erasure errors, it enables the secret to
be reconstructed from any three shares. Also, any pair
of qubits provides no information about the data. This
is a consequence of the following more general theorem.
Theorem 3. If a quantum code with codewords of
length 2k−1 corrects k−1 erasure errors (which, for sta-
bilizer codes [15,16], is a [[2k − 1, 1, k]]q code, where q is
the dimensionality of each coordinate and of the encoded
state) then it is also a ((k, 2k − 1)) threshold scheme.
Proof. First, suppose that we are given a set of k shares.
Since this set excludes precisely k − 1 shares and the
code corrects any k − 1 erasures, the secret can be re-
constructed from these k shares. On the other hand,
suppose that we are given a set of k − 1 shares. This
subset excludes a set of k shares, from which we know
that the secret can be perfectly reconstructed. Now, in
quantum mechanics, it is well-known that any informa-
tion gain on an unknown quantum state necessarily leads
to its disturbance [17]. Therefore, if a measurement on
the given k − 1 shares provided any information about
the secret, then this measurement would disturb the in-
formation that the remaining k qubits contain about the
secret. This leads to a contradiction. 2
Combining Theorem 3 with Theorem 1, we obtain
Corollary 4. From a [[2k − 1, 1, k]]q code, a ((k, n))
threshold scheme can be constructed for any n < 2k.
For example, from the aforementioned five-qubit code,
a ((3, 4)) threshold scheme and ((3, 3)) threshold scheme
can be obtained (by discarding shares).
Next, we prove the converse of Theorem 2.
Theorem 5. If n < 2k, then a ((k, n)) threshold scheme
exists. Moreover, the dimension of each share can be
bounded above by 2max(2k − 1, s), where s is the di-
mension of the quantum secret.
Proof. The proof is based on a class of quantum poly-
nomial codes, which are similar to those defined by
Aharonov and Ben-Or [18], who used them in the context
of fault-tolerant quantum computation. We will show
how to construct such a code of length m and degree
k−1 wheneverm < 2k, and that the data that it encodes
can always be recovered from any k of its m coordinates.
Then, considering the special case where m = 2k − 1,
we obtain a [[2k − 1, 1, k]]q code, for which Corollary 4
applies to prove the theorem.
Let k and m be given with m < 2k, and let s be the
dimension of the quantum state to be encoded. Choose
a prime q such that max(m, s) ≤ q ≤ 2max(m, s)
(which is always possible [19]) and let F = Zq. For
c = (c0, c1, . . . , ck−1) ∈ F
k, define the polynomial pc(t) =
c0 + c1t+ · · ·+ ck−1t
k−1. Let x0, . . . , xm−1 be m distinct
elements of F. Encode a q-ary quantum state by the
linear mapping which is defined on basis states |s〉 (for
s ∈ F) as
|s〉 7→
∑
c∈Fk
ck−1=s
|pc(x0), . . . , pc(xm−1)〉 . (5)
As an example, it turns out that mapping (1) (for the
((2, 3)) threshold scheme given at the beginning of this
paper) is a quantum polynomial code with k = 2, m = 3,
and q = 3.
It now suffices to show that, given an encoding (5) of
a quantum state, the state can be recovered from any k
of the m coordinates. One way to show this is to apply
the theory of CSS codes [20,21], noting that this code is
formed from the two classical codes
C1 =
{
(pc(x0), . . . , pc(xm−1)) | c ∈ F
k
}
(6)
C2 =
{
(pc(x0), . . . , pc(xm−1)) | c ∈ F
k, ck−1 = 0
}
(7)
and that min(dist C1, dist C
⊥
2 ) = m − k + 1. From this
it follows that the code corrects m− k erasure errors.
For completeness, we also give an explicit decoding
procedure for the case of interest, where m = 2k−1. We
begin with some preliminary definitions. For an invert-
ible d × d matrix M , define the operation apply M to a
sequence of d quantum registers as applying the mapping
|(y0, . . . , yd−1)〉 7→ |(y0, . . . , yd−1)M〉 (8)
(where we are equating |(y0, . . . , yd−1)〉 with
|y0, . . . , yd−1〉). For z0, . . . , zd−1 ∈ F, define the d × d
Vandermonde matrix
[Vd(z0, . . . , zd−1)]ij = z
i
j (9)
(for i, j ∈ {0, . . . , d−1}). This matrix is invertible when-
ever z0, . . . , zd−1 are distinct. Also, note that applying
Vd(z0, . . . , zd−1) to registers in state |c0, . . . , cd−1〉 yields
the state |pc(z0), . . . , pc(zd−1)〉, where c = (c0, . . . , cd−1).
The secret can be recovered from any k coordinates by
the following procedure. Call the m registers containing
the coordinates R0, . . . , Rm−1, and suppose that we are
given, say, the first k registers (that is, R0, . . . , Rk−1).
1. Apply Vk(x0, . . . , xk−1)
−1 to R0, . . . , Rk−1.
2. Cyclically shift the first k registers by one
to the right by setting (R0, R1 . . . , Rk−1) to
(Rk−1, R0, . . . , Rk−2).
3. Apply Vk−1(xk, . . . , xm−1) to R1, . . . , Rk−1.
4. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}, add R0·(xk+i−1)
k−1 to Ri.
Consider an execution of the above procedure on a
state resulting from the encoding (5) on a basis state
|s〉. After steps 1 and 2, the state of the n registers is
∑
c∈Fk
ck−1=s
|ck−1, c0, . . . , ck−2〉 |pc(xk), . . . , pc(xm−1)〉
= |s〉
∑
c∈Fk
ck−1=s
|c0, . . . , ck−2〉 |pc(xk), . . . , pc(xm−1)〉 . (10)
If the data is a basis state |s〉 (for some s ∈ F) then,
at this point, its recovery is complete. However, for a
general secret, which is a superposition of |s〉 states, reg-
ister R0 is entangled with the other registers. The en-
tanglement is due to the fact that, in (10), the value
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of s can be determined by the value of any of the kets
|c0, . . . , ck−2〉 |pc(xk), . . . , pc(xm−1)〉. In fact, if we had
m ≥ 2k then s could be determined from just the state
of the last m − k registers, so it would be impossible to
perform the necessary disentanglement by accessing only
the first k registers. Since m = 2k−1, this is not a prob-
lem and the remaining steps correctly extract the data
in the following manner.
After steps 3 and 4, the state is
|s〉
∑
c∈Fk
ck−1=s
|pc(xk), . . . , pc(xm−1)〉 |pc(xk), . . . , pc(xm−1)〉
= |s〉
∑
y∈Fk−1
|y1, . . . , yk−1〉 |y1, . . . , yk−1〉 , (11)
where the last equality holds since, for any s ∈ F and
y1, . . . , yk−1 ∈ F, there is a unique c ∈ F
k with ck−1 = s
such that pc(xk+i−1) = yi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}. Since
the state of R1, . . . , Rm−1 is now independent of s, the
decoding procedure is now correct for arbitrary data. 2
Although we have focused on threshold schemes, it
is possible to consider more general access structures.
In a general quantum secret sharing scheme, from cer-
tain authorized sets of shares, the secret can be recon-
structed, while, from all other sets of shares, no infor-
mation can be obtained about the secret. Those other
sets are called unauthorized sets. For example, consider
a scenario with three shares, A, B, C, where the autho-
rized sets are {A,B}, {A,C}, and any superset of one of
these sets. Such a secret sharing scheme can be easily im-
plemented by starting with the ((3, 4)) threshold scheme
and bundling the first two shares into the share A.
We have already seen relationships between quan-
tum secret sharing schemes and quantum error-correcting
codes. We now explore this connection more deeply.
The following proposition follows naturally from the
usual formulation of the conditions for a quantum error-
correcting code.
Proposition 6. Let C be a subspace of a Hilbert space
H. The following conditions are equivalent:
a) C corrects erasures on a set K of coordinates.
b) For any orthonormal basis {|φi〉} of C,
〈φi|E|φj〉 = 0 (i 6= j) (12)
〈φi|E|φi〉 = c(E) (13)
for all operators E acting on K.
c) For all (normalized) |φ〉 ∈ C and all E acting on K,
〈φ|E|φ〉 = c(E). (14)
Note that the same function c(E) appears in conditions
(b) and (c), and that it is independent of |φ〉 or |φi〉.
Proof. a)⇔ b) is essentially the standard quantum error
correction conditions [13,23] applied to erasure errors [9].
b) ⇔ c) is straightforward. Alternately, a) ⇔ c) follows
from the main theorem of [22]. 2
Equation (12) says that in correcting errors, we will
never confuse two different basis vectors. Equation (13)
says that learning about the error will never give us any
information about which basis vector we have. This is im-
portant, since that information would constitute a mea-
surement, collapsing a superposition of basis vectors.
On the other hand, condition (14) simply says that
the environment can never gain any information about
the state. In other words, the proposition tells us that
protecting a state from noise is exactly the same as pre-
venting the environment from learning about it.
Condition (14) is also very convenient for our purposes,
since the two constraints that arise on a quantum secret
sharing scheme are the ability to correct erasures and the
requirement that no information be gained by unautho-
rized sets of shares.
In the theory of quantum error-correcting codes, we
usually consider shares of the same dimension. In con-
trast, in quantum secret sharing, we would like to allow
shares to live in Hilbert spaces of different sizes. Never-
theless, it is still true that conditions a), b), and c) in
Proposition 6 are equivalent.
Theorem 7. An encoding f : |ψ〉 7→ |φ〉 is a pure state
quantum secret sharing scheme iff
〈φ|E|φ〉 = c(E) (15)
(independent of |φ〉) whenever E is an operator acting
on the complement of an authorized set or when E is an
operator acting on an unauthorized set.
For instance, for the three-qutrit scheme (1) and
Ej |y1, y2, y3〉 = ω
yj |y1, y2, y3〉, where ω = exp(2pii/3),
we have 〈φ|Ej |φ〉 = 0 for all states |φ〉 used in the scheme.
Proof. Let C be the image of f . S is an authorized
set iff the subspace C can correct for erasures on K, the
complement of S. By Proposition 6, this means S is an
authorized set iff (15) holds for all E acting on K. T is
an unauthorized set whenever we can gain no information
about the state |ψ〉 from any measurement on T . That is,
the expectation value 〈φ|E|φ〉 is independent of |φ〉 ∈ C
for any operator E we could choose to measure, which
means it must act on T . Again, this is condition (15). 2
Theorem 7 has at least one remarkable consequence:
Corollary 8. For a pure state quantum secret sharing
scheme, every unauthorized set of shares is the comple-
ment of an authorized set and vice-versa.
Proof. If the complement of an authorized set of shares
S1 were another authorized set S2 then we could create
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two copies of the secret from S1 and S2, violating the
no-cloning theorem. Therefore, the complement of an
authorized set is always an unauthorized set.
On the other hand, by Proposition 6, if condition (15)
holds on an unauthorized set T , we can correct erasures
on T , and therefore reconstruct the secret on the com-
plement of T . Therefore, the complement of an unautho-
rized set is always an authorized set. 2
For a pure state ((k, n)) threshold scheme, this condi-
tion implies that n− k = k − 1. Therefore:
Corollary 9. Any ((k, n)) pure state threshold scheme
satisfies n = 2k − 1.
Clearly, this corollary does not apply to mixed state
schemes, since we have constructed ((k, n)) threshold
schemes with n < 2k − 1.
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